tests.yml: Add sechecker testing.

Add initial privilege and integrity tests.

Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <chpebeni@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kenton Groombridge <concord@gentoo.org>

1 files changed, 401 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/testing/sechecker.ini b/testing/sechecker.ini
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b873b94e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/sechecker.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+#
+# SELinux Reference policy validation checks
+#
+# Note to users: This file is a good starting point for tightening your own
+# policy.  However, these checks are for the entire Reference Policy, i.e.,
+# all modules are included in the policy.  If you are using a subset of the
+# modules, the best starting place is to review each of the checks and remove
+# the types in the exempt lists that are not in your policy.  Types that are
+# in these lists but not in your policy will *NOT* cause sechecker to fail.
+#
+# Note to developers: In general, please avoid using attributes in the
+# exempt lists.  This will make it less likely for unexpected types to pass.
+#
+
+[PRIVILEGE-load_policy]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only the load_policy program can load a SELinux policy update.
+tclass = security
+perms = load_policy
+exempt_source = kernel_t            # Kernel thread loading policy at boot
+                load_policy_t       # SELinux policy loading tool
+
+[PRIVILEGE-setbool]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify SELinux Booleans can be changed only by expected domains.
+tclass = security
+perms = setbool
+exempt_source = cloud_init_t        # VM configuration on initial boot
+                init_t
+                load_policy_t       # Persist Boolean state across policy loads
+                puppet_t            # Puppet can configure Booleans
+                secadm_t            # Security admin role
+                semanage_t          # SELinux management tool, including Booleans
+                sysadm_t            # System admin role
+
+[PRIVILEGE-setenforce]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains can change SELinux to permissive mode.
+tclass = security
+perms = setenforce
+exempt_source = cloud_init_t        # VM configuration on initial boot
+                secadm_t            # Security admin role
+                sysadm_t            # System admin role
+
+[PRIVILEGE-CAP_SYS_MODULE]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains have CAP_SYS_MODULE (kernel module capability)
+tclass = capability
+perms = sys_module
+exempt_source = init_t
+                kernel_t
+                kmod_t
+                spc_t
+                systemd_modules_load_t
+                udev_t
+
+[PRIVILEGE-module_load]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains can directly load kernel modules
+tclass = system
+perms = module_load
+# This list should match the above PRIVILEGE-CAP_SYS_MODULE exempt_source list.
+exempt_source = init_t
+                kernel_t
+                kmod_t
+                spc_t
+                systemd_modules_load_t
+                udev_t
+
+[PRIVILEGE-CAP_SYS_ADMIN]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+tclass = capability
+perms = sys_admin
+# CAP_SYS_ADMIN is a kitchen sink of privileges, which means many privileged domains need it.
+exempt_source = acpi_t
+                acpid_t
+                afs_t
+                auditadm_sudo_t     # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                automount_t
+                bluetooth_t
+                bootloader_t        # Install bootloader
+                cachefilesd_t
+                cgclear_t           # Move processes out of cgroups
+                cgconfig_t          # Configure cgroups
+                cgmanager_t         # Container cgroup manager
+                cgred_t             # Move processes to cgroups based on configurable rules
+                chromium_sandbox_t
+                cockpit_session_t
+                container_engine_t
+                consoletype_t
+                container_t         # Conditional access (container_use_sysadmin or container_use_host_all_caps)
+                corosync_t
+                crio_t
+                crond_t             # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                cryfs_t
+                cupsd_t
+                devicekit_disk_t
+                devicekit_power_t
+                disk_munin_plugin_t
+                dmesg_t             # Clear kernel printk buffer/set kernel log level
+                dockerd_t           # Container engine (namespacing)
+                dockerd_user_t      # Container engine (namespacing)
+                dphysswapfile_t     # Configure swap files
+                entropyd_t          # Add entropy to the system
+                fapolicyd_t
+                fsadm_t
+                fsdaemon_t
+                ftpd_t
+                getty_t             # Configure tty devices
+                glusterd_t
+                gpm_t
+                hostname_t          # Set hostname
+                hypervvssd_t
+                ifconfig_t
+                init_t
+                initrc_t
+                iscsid_t
+                kdump_t
+                kernel_t            # Kernel threads have all caps
+                klogd_t
+                kubeadm_t
+                lircd_t
+                local_login_t       # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                lvm_t               # Configure logical volumes
+                mcelog_t            # Decode and log CPU machine check exceptions
+                mdadm_t             # Configure software RAID
+                modemmanager_t
+                mon_local_test_t
+                mount_t             # (un)mount filesystems
+                nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t
+                newrole_t           # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                nfsd_t
+                ntop_t
+                plymouthd_t
+                podman_t
+                podman_user_t
+                postgresql_t
+                pppd_t
+                quota_t             # Configure filesystem quotas
+                remote_login_t      # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                resmgrd_t
+                rlogind_t           # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                rngd_t
+                rootlesskit_t       # Container engine (namespacing)
+                rpcd_t
+                rpm_script_t        # Package manager post-install scripts
+                rshd_t              # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                secadm_sudo_t       # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                seunshare_t         # Create new flesystem namespaces
+                shorewall_t
+                smbd_t
+                smbmount_t          # Mount SMB and CIFS filesystems
+                sosreport_t
+                spc_t
+                sshd_t              # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                sssd_t
+                staff_sudo_t        # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                sulogin_t
+                sysadm_t            # System admin role
+                sysadm_sudo_t       # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                syslogd_t
+                sysstat_t
+                systemd_generator_t
+                systemd_homework_t  # Mount home directory images
+                systemd_hostnamed_t # Set hostname
+                systemd_logind_t
+                systemd_machine_id_setup_t
+                systemd_nspawn_t
+                systemd_sysctl_t
+                systemd_tmpfiles_t
+                systemd_user_runtime_dir_t
+                tuned_t
+                udev_t
+                user_sudo_t         # Conditional access (allow_polyinstantiation)
+                vbetool_t
+                virtd_t             # libvirt virtualization manager
+                virtd_lxc_t         # libvirt LXC container engine (namespacing)
+                vmware_t            # VMWare virtualization manager
+                watchdog_t
+                xserver_t
+                zed_t               # ZFS events daemon (filesystem event monitoring)
+                zfs_t               # ZFS filesystem tools
+
+[PRIVILEGE-CAP_SYS_RAWIO]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains can use CAP_SYS_RAWIO
+tclass = capability
+perms = sys_rawio
+exempt_source = abrt_t              # Conditional access (allow_raw_memory_access)
+                blkmapd_t
+                bootloader_t        # Install bootloader, raw disk access
+                cdrecord_t          # Burn optical media
+                container_t         # Conditional access (container_use_host_all_caps)
+                cpucontrol_t
+                cupsd_t
+                devicekit_disk_t
+                disk_munin_plugin_t
+                dmidecode_t
+                fsadm_t
+                fsdaemon_t
+                hddtemp_t
+                hwclock_t
+                init_t
+                initrc_t
+                kernel_t            # Kernel threads have all caps
+                kdump_t
+                klogd_t             # Conditional access (allow_raw_memory_access)
+                lvm_t
+                mcelog_t            # Conditional access (allow_raw_memory_access)
+                mount_t
+                munin_t
+                nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t
+                rasdaemon_t         # Monitors ECC errors
+                resmgrd_t           # Device resource manager
+                rpm_script_t        # Package manager post-install scripts
+                smbmount_t
+                sosreport_t         # Conditional access (allow_raw_memory_access)
+                spc_t
+                sysadm_t            # System admin role
+                udev_t
+                vbetool_t           # Conditional access (allow_raw_memory_access)
+                vmware_t
+                xdm_t
+                xserver_t
+                zfs_t
+
+[PRIVILEGE-CAP_NET_ADMIN]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only expected domains can use CAP_NET_ADMIN.
+tclass = capability
+perms = net_admin
+exempt_source = arpwatch_t
+                asterisk_t
+                avahi_t
+                bird_t
+                blueman_t
+                bluetooth_t
+                brctl_t
+                cgred_t
+                chronyd_t           # Conditional access (chronyd_hwtimestamp)
+                condor_startd_t
+                container_engine_t
+                container_t         # Conditional access (container_use_host_all_caps)
+                crio_t
+                ctdbd_t
+                devicekit_disk_t
+                devicekit_power_t
+                dhcpc_t
+                dnsmasq_t
+                dockerd_t
+                dockerd_user_t
+                dpkg_script_t
+                drbd_t
+                fcoemon_t
+                firewalld_t
+                hostapd_t
+                hypervkvpd_t
+                hypervvssd_t
+                ifconfig_t
+                ifplugd_t
+                init_t
+                initrc_t
+                iodined_t
+                ipsec_t
+                ipsec_mgmt_t
+                ipsec_supervisor_t
+                iptables_t
+                iscsid_t
+                kernel_t
+                kismet_t
+                krb5kdc_t
+                kubeadm_t
+                kubelet_t
+                l2tpd_t
+                lldpad_t
+                lvm_t
+                minissdpd_t
+                modemmanager_t
+                ncftool_t
+                ndc_t
+                netlabel_mgmt_t
+                netutils_t
+                NetworkManager_t
+                nsd_t
+                ntop_t
+                openvpn_t
+                openvswitch_t
+                pegasus_t
+                podman_t
+                podman_user_t
+                portslave_t
+                pppd_t
+                pptp_t
+                psad_t
+                racoon_t
+                radvd_t
+                rkhunter_t
+                rootlesskit_t
+                rpm_script_t
+                setkey_t
+                shorewall_t
+                snmpd_t
+                snort_t
+                sosreport_t
+                spc_t
+                squid_t             # Conditional access (squid_use_tproxy)
+                sssd_t
+                sysadm_t
+                syslogd_t           # Conditional network config (logging_syslog_can_network)
+                system_cronjob_t
+                system_munin_plugin_t
+                systemd_cgroups_t
+                systemd_networkd_t
+                systemd_nspawn_t
+                systemd_sysctl_t
+                systemd_tmpfiles_t
+                traceroute_t
+                udev_t
+                ulogd_t
+                virt_bridgehelper_t
+                virtd_t
+                virtd_lxc_t
+                vpnc_t
+                watchdog_t
+                wireguard_t
+                wireshark_t
+                xm_t
+                zebra_t
+
+[PRIVILEGE-setcurrent]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify only the expected domains can change their process label.
+tclass = process
+perms = setcurrent
+exempt_source = chromium_t            # Changes MCS level for each tab
+                kernel_t              # When systemd loads the policy it has the kernel_t label and changes context to init_t
+                sepgsql_ranged_proc_t # Changes MCS level
+
+[NONTRANQUILITY-systemd]
+check_type = assert_te
+desc = Verify dynamic transition allowed by PRIVILEGE-setcurrent test can only
+       go from kernel_t to init_t (systemd)
+source = kernel_t
+tclass = process
+perms = dyntransition
+# kernel_t -> kernel_t and kernel_t -> init_t
+exempt_target = init_t kernel_t
+
+[INTEGRITY-readonly-executables]
+check_type = ro_execs
+#
+# This is an expensive check, but this security goal is important to verify.
+# To tighten your policy, first try to remove entries from exempt_file, as it
+# is very broad in terms of this check, as the type is simply ignored both for
+# write checks and for execute checks.
+#
+# Next, try to remove entries from exempt_write_domain.  These are domains that
+# are accepted as able to write executables.
+#
+# If you don't have unconfined domains, you should remove the
+# exempt_exec_domain option.  The only purpose for this option is because all
+# file types would be considered executable otherwise.
+#
+# When you have a failure on this test, first verify that the file type is
+# supposed to be executable; if not, remove the exec access.  If it is supposed
+# to be executable, verify domains that have write access are legitimate
+# writers.  If the access is legitimate, e.g. by a package manager, add the
+# domain to exempt_write_domain.  If not, remove the write access.
+#
+desc = Enforce executable files (including libraries) are not writable
+       except from expected domains, such as package managers.
+exempt_file = container_file_t       # Container files don't distinguish executables.
+              container_ro_file_t    # Container files don't distinguish executables.
+              gstreamer_orcexec_t    # OIL Runtime Compiler code optimizer is used by pulseaudio
+              httpd_script_exec_type # Web admin can edit scripts
+              httpdcontent           # Web admin can edit scripts, webalizer output, etc.
+              noxattrfs              # Filesystem does not support xattrs; executable by users, can't distinguish executables
+              user_home_content_type # User home content, users can install apps in own home, write scripts, etc. JIT compiles, and libFFI use.
+exempt_write_domain = cloud_init_t        # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (cloudinit_manage_non_security)
+                      dpkg_t              # Package manager
+                      dpkg_script_t       # Package manager
+                      gcc_config_t        # Gentoo compiler chooser
+                      init_t              # Systemd can create file mountpoints
+                      ftpd_t              # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (allow_ftpd_full_access)
+                      kernel_t            # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (nfs_export_all_rw)
+                      nfsd_t              # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (nfs_export_all_rw)
+                      nmbd_t              # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (samba_export_all_rw)
+                      prelink_t           # Prelinking executables
+                      portage_t           # Package manager
+                      puppet_t            # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (puppet_manage_all_files)
+                      rpm_t               # Package manager
+                      rpm_script_t        # Package manager
+                      sftpd_t             # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (sftpd_full_access)
+                      smbd_t              # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (samba_export_all_rw)
+                      systemd_tmpfiles_t  # Can conditionally manage all non-auth files (systemd_tmpfiles_manage_all)
+                      sysadm_t            # Privileged admin domain
+                      files_unconfined_type
+# files_unconfined_type: Unconfined; can execute anything; muddies the water on what is
+# intended to be executable by constrained domains.
+exempt_exec_domain = files_unconfined_type