Linux patch 3.14.733.14-80

2 files changed, 2841 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README
index d2e93d29..7e32ae1f 100644
--- a/0000_README
+++ b/0000_README
@@ -330,6 +330,10 @@ Patch:  1071_linux-3.14.72.patch
 From:   http://www.kernel.org
 Desc:   Linux 3.14.72
 
+Patch:  1072_linux-3.14.73.patch
+From:   http://www.kernel.org
+Desc:   Linux 3.14.73
+
 Patch:  1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch
 From:   https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644
 Desc:   Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs.
diff --git a/1072_linux-3.14.73.patch b/1072_linux-3.14.73.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c43abbc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1072_linux-3.14.73.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2837 @@
+diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+index 88152f214f48..302b5ed616a6 100644
+--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
+ - nr_open
+ - overflowuid
+ - overflowgid
++- pipe-user-pages-hard
++- pipe-user-pages-soft
+ - protected_hardlinks
+ - protected_symlinks
+ - suid_dumpable
+@@ -159,6 +161,27 @@ The default is 65534.
+ 
+ ==============================================================
+ 
++pipe-user-pages-hard:
++
++Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes.
++Once this limit is reached, no new pipes may be allocated until usage goes
++below the limit again. When set to 0, no limit is applied, which is the default
++setting.
++
++==============================================================
++
++pipe-user-pages-soft:
++
++Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes
++before the pipe size gets limited to a single page. Once this limit is reached,
++new pipes will be limited to a single page in size for this user in order to
++limit total memory usage, and trying to increase them using fcntl() will be
++denied until usage goes below the limit again. The default value allows to
++allocate up to 1024 pipes at their default size. When set to 0, no limit is
++applied.
++
++==============================================================
++
+ protected_hardlinks:
+ 
+ A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index 6155aaf6342a..939dfae7bb5f 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ VERSION = 3
+ PATCHLEVEL = 14
+-SUBLEVEL = 72
++SUBLEVEL = 73
+ EXTRAVERSION =
+ NAME = Remembering Coco
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+index 0dd3b79b15c3..ec33df500f86 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+@@ -733,8 +733,8 @@ static int vfp_set(struct task_struct *target,
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+-	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
+ 	thread->vfpstate.hard = new_vfp;
++	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
+index 3605b844ad87..efe9964ea9b4 100644
+--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ extern unsigned int vced_count, vcei_count;
+  * User space process size: 2GB. This is hardcoded into a few places,
+  * so don't change it unless you know what you are doing.
+  */
+-#define TASK_SIZE	0x7fff8000UL
++#define TASK_SIZE	0x80000000UL
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
+index d7c0acb35ec2..8d49614d600d 100644
+--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
++++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
+@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (modify && R1(regs->iir))
++	if (ret == 0 && modify && R1(regs->iir))
+ 		regs->gr[R1(regs->iir)] = newbase;
+ 
+ 
+@@ -677,6 +677,14 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ 
+ 	if (ret)
+ 	{
++		/*
++		 * The unaligned handler failed.
++		 * If we were called by __get_user() or __put_user() jump
++		 * to it's exception fixup handler instead of crashing.
++		 */
++		if (!user_mode(regs) && fixup_exception(regs))
++			return;
++
+ 		printk(KERN_CRIT "Unaligned handler failed, ret = %d\n", ret);
+ 		die_if_kernel("Unaligned data reference", regs, 28);
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
+index 92c538d5ed19..940b15703885 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
+@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
+ #define   MMCR0_FCWAIT	0x00000002UL /* freeze counter in WAIT state */
+ #define   MMCR0_FCHV	0x00000001UL /* freeze conditions in hypervisor mode */
+ #define SPRN_MMCR1	798
+-#define SPRN_MMCR2	769
++#define SPRN_MMCR2	785
+ #define SPRN_MMCRA	0x312
+ #define   MMCRA_SDSYNC	0x80000000UL /* SDAR synced with SIAR */
+ #define   MMCRA_SDAR_DCACHE_MISS 0x40000000UL
+@@ -715,13 +715,13 @@
+ #define SPRN_PMC6	792
+ #define SPRN_PMC7	793
+ #define SPRN_PMC8	794
+-#define SPRN_SIAR	780
+-#define SPRN_SDAR	781
+ #define SPRN_SIER	784
+ #define   SIER_SIPR		0x2000000	/* Sampled MSR_PR */
+ #define   SIER_SIHV		0x1000000	/* Sampled MSR_HV */
+ #define   SIER_SIAR_VALID	0x0400000	/* SIAR contents valid */
+ #define   SIER_SDAR_VALID	0x0200000	/* SDAR contents valid */
++#define SPRN_SIAR	796
++#define SPRN_SDAR	797
+ #define SPRN_TACR	888
+ #define SPRN_TCSCR	889
+ #define SPRN_CSIGR	890
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
+index 83da53fde6b5..6700b83b7259 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
+@@ -615,29 +615,50 @@ static int pseries_eeh_configure_bridge(struct eeh_pe *pe)
+ {
+ 	int config_addr;
+ 	int ret;
++	/* Waiting 0.2s maximum before skipping configuration */
++	int max_wait = 200;
+ 
+ 	/* Figure out the PE address */
+ 	config_addr = pe->config_addr;
+ 	if (pe->addr)
+ 		config_addr = pe->addr;
+ 
+-	/* Use new configure-pe function, if supported */
+-	if (ibm_configure_pe != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
+-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
+-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
+-	} else if (ibm_configure_bridge != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_bridge, 3, 1, NULL,
+-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
+-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
+-	} else {
+-		return -EFAULT;
+-	}
++	while (max_wait > 0) {
++		/* Use new configure-pe function, if supported */
++		if (ibm_configure_pe != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
++			ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
++					config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
++					BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
++		} else if (ibm_configure_bridge != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
++			ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_bridge, 3, 1, NULL,
++					config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
++					BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
++		} else {
++			return -EFAULT;
++		}
+ 
+-	if (ret)
+-		pr_warning("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%d-PE#%x (%d)\n",
+-			__func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr, ret);
++		if (!ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		/*
++		 * If RTAS returns a delay value that's above 100ms, cut it
++		 * down to 100ms in case firmware made a mistake.  For more
++		 * on how these delay values work see rtas_busy_delay_time
++		 */
++		if (ret > RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2 &&
++		    ret <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX)
++			ret = RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2;
++
++		max_wait -= rtas_busy_delay_time(ret);
++
++		if (max_wait < 0)
++			break;
++
++		rtas_busy_delay(ret);
++	}
+ 
++	pr_warn("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%d-PE#%x (%d)\n",
++		__func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr, ret);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+index 8db66424be97..6cb4ce77df19 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+@@ -3029,6 +3029,11 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ 	if (dbgregs->flags)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++	if (dbgregs->dr6 & ~0xffffffffull)
++		return -EINVAL;
++	if (dbgregs->dr7 & ~0xffffffffull)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	memcpy(vcpu->arch.db, dbgregs->db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
+ 	vcpu->arch.dr6 = dbgregs->dr6;
+ 	kvm_update_dr6(vcpu);
+diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
+index 0237ab58f242..a39ee43d1a79 100644
+--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
+ 	struct ccp_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
+ 	struct ccp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ 	unsigned int unit;
++	u32 unit_size;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	if (!ctx->u.aes.key_len)
+@@ -134,11 +135,17 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
+ 	if (!req->info)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	for (unit = 0; unit < ARRAY_SIZE(unit_size_map); unit++)
+-		if (!(req->nbytes & (unit_size_map[unit].size - 1)))
+-			break;
++	unit_size = CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST;
++	if (req->nbytes <= unit_size_map[0].size) {
++		for (unit = 0; unit < ARRAY_SIZE(unit_size_map); unit++) {
++			if (!(req->nbytes & (unit_size_map[unit].size - 1))) {
++				unit_size = unit_size_map[unit].value;
++				break;
++			}
++		}
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((unit_size_map[unit].value == CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST) ||
++	if ((unit_size == CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST) ||
+ 	    (ctx->u.aes.key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
+ 		/* Use the fallback to process the request for any
+ 		 * unsupported unit sizes or key sizes
+@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
+ 	rctx->cmd.engine = CCP_ENGINE_XTS_AES_128;
+ 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.action = (encrypt) ? CCP_AES_ACTION_ENCRYPT
+ 					   : CCP_AES_ACTION_DECRYPT;
+-	rctx->cmd.u.xts.unit_size = unit_size_map[unit].value;
++	rctx->cmd.u.xts.unit_size = unit_size;
+ 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.key = &ctx->u.aes.key_sg;
+ 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.key_len = ctx->u.aes.key_len;
+ 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.iv = &rctx->iv_sg;
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
+index 7645a3ce3854..b2af06444c2d 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
+@@ -451,6 +451,17 @@ fail:
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+ 
++static void efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
++{
++	struct efx_channel *channel;
++	struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
++
++	/* All our existing PIO buffers went away */
++	efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx)
++		efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue(tx_queue, channel)
++			tx_queue->piobuf = NULL;
++}
++
+ #else /* !EFX_USE_PIO */
+ 
+ static int efx_ef10_alloc_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx, unsigned int n)
+@@ -467,6 +478,10 @@ static void efx_ef10_free_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
+ {
+ }
+ 
++static void efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
++{
++}
++
+ #endif /* EFX_USE_PIO */
+ 
+ static void efx_ef10_remove(struct efx_nic *efx)
+@@ -698,6 +713,7 @@ static void efx_ef10_reset_mc_allocations(struct efx_nic *efx)
+ 	nic_data->must_realloc_vis = true;
+ 	nic_data->must_restore_filters = true;
+ 	nic_data->must_restore_piobufs = true;
++	efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(efx);
+ 	nic_data->rx_rss_context = EFX_EF10_RSS_CONTEXT_INVALID;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
+index 9b235362efcd..47c06888dc05 100644
+--- a/fs/dcache.c
++++ b/fs/dcache.c
+@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ struct dentry *d_alloc(struct dentry * parent, const struct qstr *name)
+ 	struct dentry *dentry = __d_alloc(parent->d_sb, name);
+ 	if (!dentry)
+ 		return NULL;
+-
++	dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
+ 	spin_lock(&parent->d_lock);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * don't need child lock because it is not subject
+@@ -2352,7 +2352,6 @@ static void __d_rehash(struct dentry * entry, struct hlist_bl_head *b)
+ {
+ 	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(entry));
+ 	hlist_bl_lock(b);
+-	entry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
+ 	hlist_bl_add_head_rcu(&entry->d_hash, b);
+ 	hlist_bl_unlock(b);
+ }
+@@ -2536,6 +2535,7 @@ static void __d_move(struct dentry * dentry, struct dentry * target)
+ 
+ 	/* ... and switch the parents */
+ 	if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++		dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
+ 		dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
+ 		target->d_parent = target;
+ 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&target->d_child);
+diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+index f1ea610362c6..9b661a4ccee7 100644
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/wait.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
+ #include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
+ 
+ struct ecryptfs_open_req {
+@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
+ 	flags |= IS_RDONLY(lower_dentry->d_inode) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR;
+ 	(*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
+-		goto out;
++		goto have_file;
+ 	if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
+ 		rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -165,8 +166,16 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
+ 	mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
+ 	wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait);
+ 	wait_for_completion(&req.done);
+-	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))
++	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) {
+ 		rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file);
++		goto out;
++	}
++have_file:
++	if ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL) {
++		fput(*lower_file);
++		*lower_file = NULL;
++		rc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
++	}
+ out:
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
+index a03801186366..fff8057a0809 100644
+--- a/fs/pipe.c
++++ b/fs/pipe.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;
+  */
+ unsigned int pipe_min_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ 
++/* Maximum allocatable pages per user. Hard limit is unset by default, soft
++ * matches default values.
++ */
++unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
++unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS * INR_OPEN_CUR;
++
+ /*
+  * We use a start+len construction, which provides full use of the 
+  * allocated memory.
+@@ -795,20 +801,49 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++static void account_pipe_buffers(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
++                                 unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
++{
++	atomic_long_add(new - old, &pipe->user->pipe_bufs);
++}
++
++static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
++{
++	return pipe_user_pages_soft &&
++	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
++}
++
++static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
++{
++	return pipe_user_pages_hard &&
++	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
++}
++
+ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
+ {
+ 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
+ 
+ 	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (pipe) {
+-		pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
++		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
++		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
++
++		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
++			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
++				pipe_bufs = 1;
++			pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * pipe_bufs, GFP_KERNEL);
++		}
++
+ 		if (pipe->bufs) {
+ 			init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
+ 			pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
+-			pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
++			pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
++			pipe->user = user;
++			account_pipe_buffers(pipe, 0, pipe_bufs);
+ 			mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
+ 			return pipe;
+ 		}
++		free_uid(user);
+ 		kfree(pipe);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -819,6 +854,8 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
++	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, 0);
++	free_uid(pipe->user);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
+ 		struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
+ 		if (buf->ops)
+@@ -1209,6 +1246,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
+ 			memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
+ 	}
+ 
++	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
+ 	pipe->curbuf = 0;
+ 	kfree(pipe->bufs);
+ 	pipe->bufs = bufs;
+@@ -1280,6 +1318,11 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
+ 			ret = -EPERM;
+ 			goto out;
++		} else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
++			    too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
++		           !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
++			ret = -EPERM;
++			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, nr_pages);
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+index fb8579d35cd4..47533013a772 100644
+--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
++++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+@@ -3098,7 +3098,7 @@ xfs_iflush(
+ 	 */
+ 	error = xfs_imap_to_bp(mp, NULL, &ip->i_imap, &dip, &bp, XBF_TRYLOCK,
+ 			       0);
+-	if (error == -EAGAIN) {
++	if (error == EAGAIN) {
+ 		xfs_ifunlock(ip);
+ 		return error;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+index a3e215bb0241..7741efa43b35 100644
+--- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
++++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+@@ -239,11 +239,18 @@ void xt_unregister_match(struct xt_match *target);
+ int xt_register_matches(struct xt_match *match, unsigned int n);
+ void xt_unregister_matches(struct xt_match *match, unsigned int n);
+ 
++int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
++			   unsigned int target_offset,
++			   unsigned int next_offset);
++
+ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
+ 		   bool inv_proto);
+ int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
+ 		    bool inv_proto);
+ 
++void *xt_copy_counters_from_user(const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
++				 struct xt_counters_info *info, bool compat);
++
+ struct xt_table *xt_register_table(struct net *net,
+ 				   const struct xt_table *table,
+ 				   struct xt_table_info *bootstrap,
+@@ -421,7 +428,7 @@ void xt_compat_init_offsets(u_int8_t af, unsigned int number);
+ int xt_compat_calc_jump(u_int8_t af, unsigned int offset);
+ 
+ int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match);
+-int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
++void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
+ 			      unsigned int *size);
+ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m,
+ 			    void __user **dstptr, unsigned int *size);
+@@ -431,6 +438,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
+ 				unsigned int *size);
+ int xt_compat_target_to_user(const struct xt_entry_target *t,
+ 			     void __user **dstptr, unsigned int *size);
++int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
++				  unsigned int target_offset,
++				  unsigned int next_offset);
+ 
+ #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+ #endif /* _X_TABLES_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+index ab5752692113..b3374f63bc36 100644
+--- a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
++++ b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct pipe_buffer {
+  *	@fasync_readers: reader side fasync
+  *	@fasync_writers: writer side fasync
+  *	@bufs: the circular array of pipe buffers
++ *	@user: the user who created this pipe
+  **/
+ struct pipe_inode_info {
+ 	struct mutex mutex;
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info {
+ 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers;
+ 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers;
+ 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
++	struct user_struct *user;
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ void pipe_unlock(struct pipe_inode_info *);
+ void pipe_double_lock(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_inode_info *);
+ 
+ extern unsigned int pipe_max_size, pipe_min_size;
++extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
++extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft;
+ int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
+index 7d6152a6700c..77ac8b6a5b68 100644
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h
+@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ struct user_struct {
+ #endif
+ 	unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
+ 	unsigned long unix_inflight;	/* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
++	atomic_long_t pipe_bufs;  /* how many pages are allocated in pipe buffers */
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ 	struct key *uid_keyring;	/* UID specific keyring */
+diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+index c1b26e176aa6..df9eab6928d9 100644
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -1668,6 +1668,20 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
+ 		.proc_handler	= &pipe_proc_fn,
+ 		.extra1		= &pipe_min_size,
+ 	},
++	{
++		.procname	= "pipe-user-pages-hard",
++		.data		= &pipe_user_pages_hard,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(pipe_user_pages_hard),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
++	},
++	{
++		.procname	= "pipe-user-pages-soft",
++		.data		= &pipe_user_pages_soft,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(pipe_user_pages_soft),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
++	},
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index f95b6f93814b..42155b1af373 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -355,11 +355,25 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+ 
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
+ 
+-	return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++}
++
++static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
++			     const void *entry0,
++			     const struct arpt_entry *target)
++{
++	struct arpt_entry *iter;
++
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
++		 if (iter == target)
++			return true;
++	}
++	return false;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
+@@ -398,11 +412,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
+ 
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
+-			    visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+ 
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -435,6 +448,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				size = e->next_offset;
+ 				e = (struct arpt_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + pos + size);
++				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
++					return 0;
+ 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
+ 				pos += size;
+ 			} else {
+@@ -454,9 +469,15 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
+ 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
+ 						 pos, newpos);
++					e = (struct arpt_entry *)
++						(entry0 + newpos);
++					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
++						return 0;
+ 				} else {
+ 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
+ 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
++					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
++						return 0;
+ 				}
+ 				e = (struct arpt_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + newpos);
+@@ -470,25 +491,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+-{
+-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+-
+-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
+-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
+-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+ static inline int check_target(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t = arpt_get_target(e);
+@@ -518,10 +520,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
+ 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
+ 					t->u.user.revision);
+@@ -547,7 +545,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+ 
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -566,9 +564,11 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -580,6 +580,14 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
++				     e->next_offset);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -588,9 +596,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+@@ -680,10 +688,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) {
+-		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
++	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
+ 		return -ELOOP;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
+ 	i = 0;
+@@ -1076,6 +1082,9 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ 	/* overflow check */
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1116,56 +1125,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
+ 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
+ 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
+-	unsigned int num_counters;
+-	const char *name;
+-	int size;
+-	void *ptmp;
+ 	struct xt_table *t;
+ 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
+ 	struct arpt_entry *iter;
+ 	unsigned int addend;
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
+ 
+-	if (compat) {
+-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		ptmp = &tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
+-	}
++	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
++	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
++		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
+ 
+-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
+-		return -EFAULT;
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	if (compat) {
+-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = compat_tmp.name;
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = tmp.name;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
+-	if (!paddc)
+-		return -ENOMEM;
+-
+-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
+-		ret = -EFAULT;
+-		goto free;
+-	}
+-
+-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, name);
++	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, tmp.name);
+ 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
+ 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
+ 		goto free;
+@@ -1173,7 +1144,7 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ 
+ 	local_bh_disable();
+ 	private = t->private;
+-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
++	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto unlock_up_free;
+ 	}
+@@ -1199,6 +1170,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++struct compat_arpt_replace {
++	char				name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
++	u32				valid_hooks;
++	u32				num_entries;
++	u32				size;
++	u32				hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
++	u32				underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
++	u32				num_counters;
++	compat_uptr_t			counters;
++	struct compat_arpt_entry	entries[0];
++};
++
+ static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+@@ -1207,24 +1190,22 @@ static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
+ 	module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int
++static int
+ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				  unsigned int *size,
+ 				  const unsigned char *base,
+-				  const unsigned char *limit,
+-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
+-				  const char *name)
++				  const unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	unsigned int entry_offset;
+-	int ret, off, h;
++	int ret, off;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1236,8 +1217,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
++	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
++					    e->next_offset);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+@@ -1261,17 +1245,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto release_target;
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+-	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
+-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
+-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
+-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
+-	e->comefrom = 0;
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+ release_target:
+@@ -1280,18 +1253,17 @@ out:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
++static void
+ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
++			    unsigned int *size,
+ 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	struct arpt_entry *de;
+ 	unsigned int origsize;
+-	int ret, h;
++	int h;
+ 
+-	ret = 0;
+ 	origsize = *size;
+ 	de = (struct arpt_entry *)*dstptr;
+ 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct arpt_entry));
+@@ -1312,144 +1284,81 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
+ 	}
+-	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
+-				  unsigned int valid_hooks,
+-				  struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
++static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
+ 				  void **pentry0,
+-				  unsigned int total_size,
+-				  unsigned int number,
+-				  unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-				  unsigned int *underflows)
++				  const struct compat_arpt_replace *compatr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int i, j;
+ 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
+ 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
+ 	struct compat_arpt_entry *iter0;
+-	struct arpt_entry *iter1;
++	struct arpt_replace repl;
+ 	unsigned int size;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	info = *pinfo;
+ 	entry0 = *pentry0;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	info->number = number;
+-
+-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	xt_compat_lock(NFPROTO_ARP);
+-	xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, number);
++	xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, compatr->num_entries);
+ 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
+ 							entry0,
+-							entry0 + total_size,
+-							hook_entries,
+-							underflows,
+-							name);
++							entry0 + compatr->size);
+ 		if (ret != 0)
+ 			goto out_unlock;
+ 		++j;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = -EINVAL;
+-	if (j != number) {
++	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
+ 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
+-			 j, number);
++			 j, compatr->num_entries);
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
+-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
+-			continue;
+-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
+-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
+-				 i, underflows[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
+ 	if (!newinfo)
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
+-	newinfo->number = number;
++	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+ 		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
+ 		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
+ 	pos = entry1;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
++		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
++					    newinfo, entry1);
++
++	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone */
++
+ 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
+ 	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
+-	if (ret)
+-		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+-	ret = -ELOOP;
+-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
+-		goto free_newinfo;
++	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
+ 
+-	i = 0;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-		ret = check_target(iter1, name);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-		++i;
+-		if (strcmp(arpt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
+-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
+-			++newinfo->stacksize;
+-	}
+-	if (ret) {
+-		/*
+-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
+-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
+-		 * entries need only release.
+-		 */
+-		int skip = i;
+-		j -= i;
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (skip-- > 0)
+-				continue;
+-			if (j-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
+-		}
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (i-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			cleanup_entry(iter1);
+-		}
+-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-		return ret;
++	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
++		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
++		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
+-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
+-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
++	repl.num_counters = 0;
++	repl.counters = NULL;
++	repl.size = newinfo->size;
++	ret = translate_table(newinfo, entry1, &repl);
++	if (ret)
++		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+ 	*pinfo = newinfo;
+ 	*pentry0 = entry1;
+@@ -1458,31 +1367,18 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
+ 
+ free_newinfo:
+ 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-out:
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	return ret;
++out_unlock:
++	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
++	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		if (j-- == 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
+ 	}
+ 	return ret;
+-out_unlock:
+-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
+-	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
+-	goto out;
+ }
+ 
+-struct compat_arpt_replace {
+-	char				name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
+-	u32				valid_hooks;
+-	u32				num_entries;
+-	u32				size;
+-	u32				hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+-	u32				underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+-	u32				num_counters;
+-	compat_uptr_t			counters;
+-	struct compat_arpt_entry	entries[0];
+-};
+-
+ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
+ 			     unsigned int len)
+ {
+@@ -1500,6 +1396,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1513,10 +1412,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = translate_compat_table(tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
+-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
+-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
+-				     tmp.underflow);
++	ret = translate_compat_table(&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
+ 	if (ret != 0)
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index 99e810f84671..82b6bc4f9167 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
+ 
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
+ 
+-	return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ #undef FWINV
+ }
+ 
+@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 	} else if (s == e) {
+ 		(*rulenum)++;
+ 
+-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++		if (unconditional(s) &&
+ 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
+ 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+-		   t->verdict < 0 &&
+-		   unconditional(&s->ip)) {
++		   t->verdict < 0) {
+ 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
+ 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
+ 				? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
+@@ -439,6 +439,19 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
++			     const void *entry0,
++			     const struct ipt_entry *target)
++{
++	struct ipt_entry *iter;
++
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
++		 if (iter == target)
++			return true;
++	}
++	return false;
++}
++
+ /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
+    there are loops.  Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
+ static int
+@@ -472,11 +485,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
+ 
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
+-			    visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+ 
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -517,6 +529,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				size = e->next_offset;
+ 				e = (struct ipt_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + pos + size);
++				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
++					return 0;
+ 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
+ 				pos += size;
+ 			} else {
+@@ -535,9 +549,15 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
+ 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
+ 						 pos, newpos);
++					e = (struct ipt_entry *)
++						(entry0 + newpos);
++					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
++						return 0;
+ 				} else {
+ 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
+ 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
++					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
++						return 0;
+ 				}
+ 				e = (struct ipt_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + newpos);
+@@ -565,27 +585,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+-{
+-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+-
+-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
+-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+-	    e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
+-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int
+ check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+ {
+ 	const struct ipt_ip *ip = par->entryinfo;
+@@ -662,10 +661,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	mtpar.net	= net;
+ 	mtpar.table     = name;
+@@ -709,7 +704,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+ 
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -729,9 +724,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -743,6 +740,14 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
++				     e->next_offset);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -751,9 +756,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+@@ -1263,6 +1268,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 	/* overflow check */
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1304,56 +1312,18 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
+ 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
+ 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
+-	unsigned int num_counters;
+-	const char *name;
+-	int size;
+-	void *ptmp;
+ 	struct xt_table *t;
+ 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
+ 	struct ipt_entry *iter;
+ 	unsigned int addend;
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
+-
+-	if (compat) {
+-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		ptmp = &tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
+-	}
+-
+-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
+-		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	if (compat) {
+-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = compat_tmp.name;
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = tmp.name;
+-	}
++	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
++	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
++		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
+ 
+-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
+-	if (!paddc)
+-		return -ENOMEM;
+-
+-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
+-		ret = -EFAULT;
+-		goto free;
+-	}
+-
+-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, name);
++	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, tmp.name);
+ 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
+ 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
+ 		goto free;
+@@ -1361,7 +1331,7 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
+ 
+ 	local_bh_disable();
+ 	private = t->private;
+-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
++	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto unlock_up_free;
+ 	}
+@@ -1440,7 +1410,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
+ 
+ static int
+ compat_find_calc_match(struct xt_entry_match *m,
+-		       const char *name,
+ 		       const struct ipt_ip *ip,
+ 		       unsigned int hookmask,
+ 		       int *size)
+@@ -1476,21 +1445,19 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				  unsigned int *size,
+ 				  const unsigned char *base,
+-				  const unsigned char *limit,
+-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
+-				  const char *name)
++				  const unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	unsigned int entry_offset;
+ 	unsigned int j;
+-	int ret, off, h;
++	int ret, off;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1502,8 +1469,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
++	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
++					    e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+@@ -1511,8 +1481,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 	entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name,
+-					     &e->ip, e->comefrom, &off);
++		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, &e->ip, e->comefrom,
++					     &off);
+ 		if (ret != 0)
+ 			goto release_matches;
+ 		++j;
+@@ -1535,17 +1505,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+-	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
+-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
+-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
+-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
+-	e->comefrom = 0;
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -1559,19 +1518,18 @@ release_matches:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
++static void
+ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
++			    unsigned int *size,
+ 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	struct ipt_entry *de;
+ 	unsigned int origsize;
+-	int ret, h;
++	int h;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = 0;
+ 	origsize = *size;
+ 	de = (struct ipt_entry *)*dstptr;
+ 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct ipt_entry));
+@@ -1580,198 +1538,104 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+ 	*dstptr += sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
+ 	*size += sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
+ 
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			return ret;
+-	}
++	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e)
++		xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
++
+ 	de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
+ 	t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
+ 	target = t->u.kernel.target;
+ 	xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
+ 
+ 	de->next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
++
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->hook_entry[h])
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] -= origsize - *size;
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
+ 	}
+-	return ret;
+-}
+-
+-static int
+-compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name)
+-{
+-	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+-	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+-	unsigned int j;
+-	int ret = 0;
+-
+-	j = 0;
+-	mtpar.net	= net;
+-	mtpar.table     = name;
+-	mtpar.entryinfo = &e->ip;
+-	mtpar.hook_mask = e->comefrom;
+-	mtpar.family    = NFPROTO_IPV4;
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = check_match(ematch, &mtpar);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			goto cleanup_matches;
+-		++j;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret = check_target(e, net, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		goto cleanup_matches;
+-	return 0;
+-
+- cleanup_matches:
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		if (j-- == 0)
+-			break;
+-		cleanup_match(ematch, net);
+-	}
+-	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
+-		       const char *name,
+-		       unsigned int valid_hooks,
+ 		       struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
+ 		       void **pentry0,
+-		       unsigned int total_size,
+-		       unsigned int number,
+-		       unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-		       unsigned int *underflows)
++		       const struct compat_ipt_replace *compatr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int i, j;
+ 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
+ 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
+ 	struct compat_ipt_entry *iter0;
+-	struct ipt_entry *iter1;
++	struct ipt_replace repl;
+ 	unsigned int size;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	info = *pinfo;
+ 	entry0 = *pentry0;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	info->number = number;
+-
+-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	xt_compat_lock(AF_INET);
+-	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, number);
++	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, compatr->num_entries);
+ 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
+ 							entry0,
+-							entry0 + total_size,
+-							hook_entries,
+-							underflows,
+-							name);
++							entry0 + compatr->size);
+ 		if (ret != 0)
+ 			goto out_unlock;
+ 		++j;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = -EINVAL;
+-	if (j != number) {
++	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
+ 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
+-			 j, number);
++			 j, compatr->num_entries);
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
+-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
+-			continue;
+-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
+-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
+-				 i, underflows[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
+ 	if (!newinfo)
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
+-	newinfo->number = number;
++	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
+-		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
++		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
++		newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
+ 	pos = entry1;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
++		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
++					    newinfo, entry1);
++
++	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone.
++	 * entry1/newinfo contains a 64bit ruleset that looks exactly as
++	 * generated by 64bit userspace.
++	 *
++	 * Call standard translate_table() to validate all hook_entrys,
++	 * underflows, check for loops, etc.
++	 */
+ 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
+ 	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
+-	if (ret)
+-		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+-	ret = -ELOOP;
+-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
+-		goto free_newinfo;
++	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
+ 
+-	i = 0;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-		ret = compat_check_entry(iter1, net, name);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-		++i;
+-		if (strcmp(ipt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
+-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
+-			++newinfo->stacksize;
+-	}
+-	if (ret) {
+-		/*
+-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
+-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
+-		 * entries need only release.
+-		 */
+-		int skip = i;
+-		j -= i;
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (skip-- > 0)
+-				continue;
+-			if (j-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
+-		}
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (i-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			cleanup_entry(iter1, net);
+-		}
+-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-		return ret;
++	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
++		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
++		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
+-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
+-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
++	repl.num_counters = 0;
++	repl.counters = NULL;
++	repl.size = newinfo->size;
++	ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, entry1, &repl);
++	if (ret)
++		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+ 	*pinfo = newinfo;
+ 	*pentry0 = entry1;
+@@ -1780,17 +1644,16 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
+ 
+ free_newinfo:
+ 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-out:
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	return ret;
++out_unlock:
++	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
++	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		if (j-- == 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
+ 	}
+ 	return ret;
+-out_unlock:
+-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
+-	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
+-	goto out;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -1810,6 +1673,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1824,10 +1690,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = translate_compat_table(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
+-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
+-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
+-				     tmp.underflow);
++	ret = translate_compat_table(net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
+ 	if (ret != 0)
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index e080fbbbc0e5..67d5e86dd84c 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -195,11 +195,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
+ 
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
+ 
+-	return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline const struct xt_entry_target *
+@@ -255,11 +256,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	} else if (s == e) {
+ 		(*rulenum)++;
+ 
+-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++		if (unconditional(s) &&
+ 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
+ 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+-		    t->verdict < 0 &&
+-		    unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
++		    t->verdict < 0) {
+ 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
+ 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
+ 				? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
+@@ -449,6 +449,19 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
++			     const void *entry0,
++			     const struct ip6t_entry *target)
++{
++	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
++
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
++		 if (iter == target)
++			return true;
++	}
++	return false;
++}
++
+ /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
+    there are loops.  Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
+ static int
+@@ -482,11 +495,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
+ 
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 &&
+-			     unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+ 
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -527,6 +539,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				size = e->next_offset;
+ 				e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + pos + size);
++				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
++					return 0;
+ 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
+ 				pos += size;
+ 			} else {
+@@ -545,9 +559,15 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
+ 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
+ 						 pos, newpos);
++					e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
++						(entry0 + newpos);
++					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
++						return 0;
+ 				} else {
+ 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
+ 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
++					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
++						return 0;
+ 				}
+ 				e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
+ 					(entry0 + newpos);
+@@ -574,27 +594,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ 	module_put(par.match->me);
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
+-{
+-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+-
+-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
+-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+-	    e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
+-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+ static int check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+ {
+ 	const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6 = par->entryinfo;
+@@ -673,10 +672,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	mtpar.net	= net;
+ 	mtpar.table     = name;
+@@ -720,7 +715,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+ 
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -740,9 +735,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -754,6 +751,14 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
++				     e->next_offset);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -762,9 +767,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+@@ -1273,6 +1278,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 	/* overflow check */
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1314,56 +1322,17 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
+ 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
+ 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
+ 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
+-	unsigned int num_counters;
+-	char *name;
+-	int size;
+-	void *ptmp;
+ 	struct xt_table *t;
+ 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	const void *loc_cpu_entry;
+ 	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
+ 	unsigned int addend;
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
+-
+-	if (compat) {
+-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		ptmp = &tmp;
+-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
+-	}
+-
+-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
+-		return -EFAULT;
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	if (compat) {
+-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = compat_tmp.name;
+-	} else
+-#endif
+-	{
+-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
+-		name = tmp.name;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
+-	if (!paddc)
+-		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
+-		ret = -EFAULT;
+-		goto free;
+-	}
+-
+-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, name);
++	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
++	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
++		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
++	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, tmp.name);
+ 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
+ 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
+ 		goto free;
+@@ -1372,7 +1341,7 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
+ 
+ 	local_bh_disable();
+ 	private = t->private;
+-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
++	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto unlock_up_free;
+ 	}
+@@ -1452,7 +1421,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
+ 
+ static int
+ compat_find_calc_match(struct xt_entry_match *m,
+-		       const char *name,
+ 		       const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6,
+ 		       unsigned int hookmask,
+ 		       int *size)
+@@ -1488,21 +1456,19 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				  unsigned int *size,
+ 				  const unsigned char *base,
+-				  const unsigned char *limit,
+-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
+-				  const char *name)
++				  const unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	unsigned int entry_offset;
+ 	unsigned int j;
+-	int ret, off, h;
++	int ret, off;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1514,8 +1480,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
++	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
++					    e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+@@ -1523,8 +1492,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name,
+-					     &e->ipv6, e->comefrom, &off);
++		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, &e->ipv6, e->comefrom,
++					     &off);
+ 		if (ret != 0)
+ 			goto release_matches;
+ 		++j;
+@@ -1547,17 +1516,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+-	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
+-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
+-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
+-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
+-	e->comefrom = 0;
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -1571,18 +1529,17 @@ release_matches:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
++static void
+ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
++			    unsigned int *size,
+ 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
+ {
+ 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct ip6t_entry *de;
+ 	unsigned int origsize;
+-	int ret, h;
++	int h;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = 0;
+ 	origsize = *size;
+ 	de = (struct ip6t_entry *)*dstptr;
+ 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct ip6t_entry));
+@@ -1591,11 +1548,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+ 	*dstptr += sizeof(struct ip6t_entry);
+ 	*size += sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
+ 
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			return ret;
+-	}
++	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e)
++		xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
++
+ 	de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
+ 	t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
+ 	xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
+@@ -1607,181 +1562,82 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
+ 	}
+-	return ret;
+-}
+-
+-static int compat_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net,
+-			      const char *name)
+-{
+-	unsigned int j;
+-	int ret = 0;
+-	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+-	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+-
+-	j = 0;
+-	mtpar.net	= net;
+-	mtpar.table     = name;
+-	mtpar.entryinfo = &e->ipv6;
+-	mtpar.hook_mask = e->comefrom;
+-	mtpar.family    = NFPROTO_IPV6;
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		ret = check_match(ematch, &mtpar);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			goto cleanup_matches;
+-		++j;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret = check_target(e, net, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		goto cleanup_matches;
+-	return 0;
+-
+- cleanup_matches:
+-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
+-		if (j-- == 0)
+-			break;
+-		cleanup_match(ematch, net);
+-	}
+-	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
+-		       const char *name,
+-		       unsigned int valid_hooks,
+ 		       struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
+ 		       void **pentry0,
+-		       unsigned int total_size,
+-		       unsigned int number,
+-		       unsigned int *hook_entries,
+-		       unsigned int *underflows)
++		       const struct compat_ip6t_replace *compatr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int i, j;
+ 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
+ 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
+ 	struct compat_ip6t_entry *iter0;
+-	struct ip6t_entry *iter1;
++	struct ip6t_replace repl;
+ 	unsigned int size;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	info = *pinfo;
+ 	entry0 = *pentry0;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	info->number = number;
+-
+-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 
+ 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
+ 	j = 0;
+ 	xt_compat_lock(AF_INET6);
+-	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET6, number);
++	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET6, compatr->num_entries);
+ 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
+ 							entry0,
+-							entry0 + total_size,
+-							hook_entries,
+-							underflows,
+-							name);
++							entry0 + compatr->size);
+ 		if (ret != 0)
+ 			goto out_unlock;
+ 		++j;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = -EINVAL;
+-	if (j != number) {
++	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
+ 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
+-			 j, number);
++			 j, compatr->num_entries);
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
+-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
+-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
+-			continue;
+-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
+-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
+-				 i, underflows[i]);
+-			goto out_unlock;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
+ 	if (!newinfo)
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
+-	newinfo->number = number;
++	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+-		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
+-		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
++		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
++		newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
+ 	pos = entry1;
+-	size = total_size;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-	}
++	size = compatr->size;
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
++		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
++					    newinfo, entry1);
++
++	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone. */
+ 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
+ 	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
+-	if (ret)
+-		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+-	ret = -ELOOP;
+-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
+-		goto free_newinfo;
++	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
+ 
+-	i = 0;
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-		ret = compat_check_entry(iter1, net, name);
+-		if (ret != 0)
+-			break;
+-		++i;
+-		if (strcmp(ip6t_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
+-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
+-			++newinfo->stacksize;
+-	}
+-	if (ret) {
+-		/*
+-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
+-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
+-		 * entries need only release.
+-		 */
+-		int skip = i;
+-		j -= i;
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (skip-- > 0)
+-				continue;
+-			if (j-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
+-		}
+-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
+-			if (i-- == 0)
+-				break;
+-			cleanup_entry(iter1, net);
+-		}
+-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-		return ret;
++	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
++		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
++		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
+-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
+-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
++	repl.num_counters = 0;
++	repl.counters = NULL;
++	repl.size = newinfo->size;
++	ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, entry1, &repl);
++	if (ret)
++		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+ 	*pinfo = newinfo;
+ 	*pentry0 = entry1;
+@@ -1790,17 +1646,16 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
+ 
+ free_newinfo:
+ 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
+-out:
+-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
++	return ret;
++out_unlock:
++	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
++	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
++	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
+ 		if (j-- == 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
+ 	}
+ 	return ret;
+-out_unlock:
+-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
+-	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
+-	goto out;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -1820,6 +1675,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
+ 
+ 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
+@@ -1834,10 +1692,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = translate_compat_table(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
+-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
+-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
+-				     tmp.underflow);
++	ret = translate_compat_table(net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
+ 	if (ret != 0)
+ 		goto free_newinfo;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index b50ae296537d..038304f796d8 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -1783,7 +1783,9 @@ static void get_tcp6_sock(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
+ 	destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+ 	srcp  = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ 
+-	if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS) {
++	if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
++	    icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_EARLY_RETRANS ||
++	    icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
+ 		timer_active	= 1;
+ 		timer_expires	= icsk->icsk_timeout;
+ 	} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+index 227aa11e8409..1393af786e15 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+@@ -435,6 +435,47 @@ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_check_match);
+ 
++/** xt_check_entry_match - check that matches end before start of target
++ *
++ * @match: beginning of xt_entry_match
++ * @target: beginning of this rules target (alleged end of matches)
++ * @alignment: alignment requirement of match structures
++ *
++ * Validates that all matches add up to the beginning of the target,
++ * and that each match covers at least the base structure size.
++ *
++ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
++ */
++static int xt_check_entry_match(const char *match, const char *target,
++				const size_t alignment)
++{
++	const struct xt_entry_match *pos;
++	int length = target - match;
++
++	if (length == 0) /* no matches */
++		return 0;
++
++	pos = (struct xt_entry_match *)match;
++	do {
++		if ((unsigned long)pos % alignment)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if (length < (int)sizeof(struct xt_entry_match))
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if (pos->u.match_size < sizeof(struct xt_entry_match))
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if (pos->u.match_size > length)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		length -= pos->u.match_size;
++		pos = ((void *)((char *)(pos) + (pos)->u.match_size));
++	} while (length > 0);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ int xt_compat_add_offset(u_int8_t af, unsigned int offset, int delta)
+ {
+@@ -504,13 +545,14 @@ int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_offset);
+ 
+-int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
+-			      unsigned int *size)
++void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
++			       unsigned int *size)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_match *match = m->u.kernel.match;
+ 	struct compat_xt_entry_match *cm = (struct compat_xt_entry_match *)m;
+ 	int pad, off = xt_compat_match_offset(match);
+ 	u_int16_t msize = cm->u.user.match_size;
++	char name[sizeof(m->u.user.name)];
+ 
+ 	m = *dstptr;
+ 	memcpy(m, cm, sizeof(*cm));
+@@ -524,10 +566,12 @@ int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
+ 
+ 	msize += off;
+ 	m->u.user.match_size = msize;
++	strlcpy(name, match->name, sizeof(name));
++	module_put(match->me);
++	strncpy(m->u.user.name, name, sizeof(m->u.user.name));
+ 
+ 	*size += off;
+ 	*dstptr += msize;
+-	return 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_from_user);
+ 
+@@ -558,8 +602,125 @@ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m,
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_to_user);
++
++/* non-compat version may have padding after verdict */
++struct compat_xt_standard_target {
++	struct compat_xt_entry_target t;
++	compat_uint_t verdict;
++};
++
++int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
++				  unsigned int target_offset,
++				  unsigned int next_offset)
++{
++	long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;
++	const struct compat_xt_entry_target *t;
++	const char *e = base;
++
++	if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
++	if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
++	    COMPAT_XT_ALIGN(target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_standard_target)) != next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* compat_xt_entry match has less strict aligment requirements,
++	 * otherwise they are identical.  In case of padding differences
++	 * we need to add compat version of xt_check_entry_match.
++	 */
++	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_match) != sizeof(struct xt_entry_match));
++
++	return xt_check_entry_match(elems, base + target_offset,
++				    __alignof__(struct compat_xt_entry_match));
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+ 
++/**
++ * xt_check_entry_offsets - validate arp/ip/ip6t_entry
++ *
++ * @base: pointer to arp/ip/ip6t_entry
++ * @elems: pointer to first xt_entry_match, i.e. ip(6)t_entry->elems
++ * @target_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->target_offset
++ * @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset
++ *
++ * validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane and that all
++ * match sizes (if any) align with the target offset.
++ *
++ * This function does not validate the targets or matches themselves, it
++ * only tests that all the offsets and sizes are correct, that all
++ * match structures are aligned, and that the last structure ends where
++ * the target structure begins.
++ *
++ * Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version.
++ *
++ * The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests:
++ * - it must point to a valid memory location
++ * - base to base + next_offset must be accessible, i.e. not exceed allocated
++ *   length.
++ *
++ * A well-formed entry looks like this:
++ *
++ * ip(6)t_entry   match [mtdata]  match [mtdata] target [tgdata] ip(6)t_entry
++ * e->elems[]-----'                              |               |
++ *                matchsize                      |               |
++ *                                matchsize      |               |
++ *                                               |               |
++ * target_offset---------------------------------'               |
++ * next_offset---------------------------------------------------'
++ *
++ * elems[]: flexible array member at end of ip(6)/arpt_entry struct.
++ *          This is where matches (if any) and the target reside.
++ * target_offset: beginning of target.
++ * next_offset: start of the next rule; also: size of this rule.
++ * Since targets have a minimum size, target_offset + minlen <= next_offset.
++ *
++ * Every match stores its size, sum of sizes must not exceed target_offset.
++ *
++ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
++ */
++int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
++			   const char *elems,
++			   unsigned int target_offset,
++			   unsigned int next_offset)
++{
++	long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;
++	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
++	const char *e = base;
++
++	/* target start is within the ip/ip6/arpt_entry struct */
++	if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
++	if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
++	    XT_ALIGN(target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target)) != next_offset)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	return xt_check_entry_match(elems, base + target_offset,
++				    __alignof__(struct xt_entry_match));
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_entry_offsets);
++
+ int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par,
+ 		    unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto)
+ {
+@@ -610,6 +771,80 @@ int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_check_target);
+ 
++/**
++ * xt_copy_counters_from_user - copy counters and metadata from userspace
++ *
++ * @user: src pointer to userspace memory
++ * @len: alleged size of userspace memory
++ * @info: where to store the xt_counters_info metadata
++ * @compat: true if we setsockopt call is done by 32bit task on 64bit kernel
++ *
++ * Copies counter meta data from @user and stores it in @info.
++ *
++ * vmallocs memory to hold the counters, then copies the counter data
++ * from @user to the new memory and returns a pointer to it.
++ *
++ * If @compat is true, @info gets converted automatically to the 64bit
++ * representation.
++ *
++ * The metadata associated with the counters is stored in @info.
++ *
++ * Return: returns pointer that caller has to test via IS_ERR().
++ * If IS_ERR is false, caller has to vfree the pointer.
++ */
++void *xt_copy_counters_from_user(const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
++				 struct xt_counters_info *info, bool compat)
++{
++	void *mem;
++	u64 size;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++	if (compat) {
++		/* structures only differ in size due to alignment */
++		struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
++
++		if (len <= sizeof(compat_tmp))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++		len -= sizeof(compat_tmp);
++		if (copy_from_user(&compat_tmp, user, sizeof(compat_tmp)) != 0)
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		strlcpy(info->name, compat_tmp.name, sizeof(info->name));
++		info->num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
++		user += sizeof(compat_tmp);
++	} else
++#endif
++	{
++		if (len <= sizeof(*info))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++		len -= sizeof(*info);
++		if (copy_from_user(info, user, sizeof(*info)) != 0)
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] = '\0';
++		user += sizeof(*info);
++	}
++
++	size = sizeof(struct xt_counters);
++	size *= info->num_counters;
++
++	if (size != (u64)len)
++		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++	mem = vmalloc(len);
++	if (!mem)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	if (copy_from_user(mem, user, len) == 0)
++		return mem;
++
++	vfree(mem);
++	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_copy_counters_from_user);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ int xt_compat_target_offset(const struct xt_target *target)
+ {
+@@ -625,6 +860,7 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
+ 	struct compat_xt_entry_target *ct = (struct compat_xt_entry_target *)t;
+ 	int pad, off = xt_compat_target_offset(target);
+ 	u_int16_t tsize = ct->u.user.target_size;
++	char name[sizeof(t->u.user.name)];
+ 
+ 	t = *dstptr;
+ 	memcpy(t, ct, sizeof(*ct));
+@@ -638,6 +874,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
+ 
+ 	tsize += off;
+ 	t->u.user.target_size = tsize;
++	strlcpy(name, target->name, sizeof(name));
++	module_put(target->me);
++	strncpy(t->u.user.name, name, sizeof(t->u.user.name));
+ 
+ 	*size += off;
+ 	*dstptr += tsize;
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index fd9373c9f057..d6231f219edc 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -2651,6 +2651,7 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
+ 	struct netlink_callback *cb;
+ 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+ 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
++	struct module *module;
+ 	int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
+ 	int alloc_size;
+ 
+@@ -2700,9 +2701,11 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
+ 		cb->done(cb);
+ 
+ 	nlk->cb_running = false;
++	module = cb->module;
++	skb = cb->skb;
+ 	mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
+-	module_put(cb->module);
+-	consume_skb(cb->skb);
++	module_put(module);
++	consume_skb(skb);
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+ errout_skb:
+diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-core.c b/net/wireless/wext-core.c
+index 87dd619fb2e9..1c9a505b7019 100644
+--- a/net/wireless/wext-core.c
++++ b/net/wireless/wext-core.c
+@@ -954,8 +954,29 @@ static int wireless_process_ioctl(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr,
+ 			return private(dev, iwr, cmd, info, handler);
+ 	}
+ 	/* Old driver API : call driver ioctl handler */
+-	if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl)
+-		return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
++	if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++		if (info->flags & IW_REQUEST_FLAG_COMPAT) {
++			int ret = 0;
++			struct iwreq iwr_lcl;
++			struct compat_iw_point *iwp_compat = (void *) &iwr->u.data;
++
++			memcpy(&iwr_lcl, iwr, sizeof(struct iwreq));
++			iwr_lcl.u.data.pointer = compat_ptr(iwp_compat->pointer);
++			iwr_lcl.u.data.length = iwp_compat->length;
++			iwr_lcl.u.data.flags = iwp_compat->flags;
++
++			ret = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, (void *) &iwr_lcl, cmd);
++
++			iwp_compat->pointer = ptr_to_compat(iwr_lcl.u.data.pointer);
++			iwp_compat->length = iwr_lcl.u.data.length;
++			iwp_compat->flags = iwr_lcl.u.data.flags;
++
++			return ret;
++		} else
++#endif
++			return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
++	}
+ 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+